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THE MYTH (AND REALITIES) OF FORUM 
SHOPPING IN TRANSNATIONAL  
INSOLVENCY 
John A. E. Pottow* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
decade ago, in 1996, the landscape of transnational insolvencies 
was vastly different from today. The UNCITRAL Model Law had 
not been finished, the efforts at the E.U. Insolvency Treaty were jeopard-
ized by mad cows, and no one had heard of Chapter 15. Now, all three 
universalist projects are up and running,1 putting universalism in a com-
fortable state of ascendancy. The paradigm has not been without critics, 
however, the most persistent and eloquent of which has been Professor 
Lynn LoPucki.2 LoPucki has periodically attacked universalism on a 
number of grounds. These grievances include a sovereigntist complaint 
of universalism’s insensitivity to the differences in local bankruptcy 
laws3 (a refrain now picked up in the recent writings of John Chung),4 as 
well as an operational skepticism regarding universalism’s capacity to 
consolidate corporate groups5 (which is further explored by Irit Ronen-
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 1. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3, United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law, 30th Sess., at 3, U.C. Doc A/CD.9/442 
(1999) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]; Council Regulation 1346/2000; European 
Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1–4 [hereinafter EU 
Regulation]; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532 (2007) [hereinafter Chapter 15]. 
 2. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG 
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005) [hereinafter LOPUCKI, COURTING 
FAILURE]; Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143 (2005) 
[hereinafter LoPucki, Universalism Unravels]; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Coopera-
tive Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000) [hereinafter 
LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality]. 
 3. See, e.g., LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 2, at 2237–38; see also 
Frederick Tung, Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests: Regulatory Competi-
tion and Cooperation in Corporate, Securities, and Bankruptcy Law, 3 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 
369, 375–76 (2002). 
 4. See John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step Toward 
Erosion of National Sovereignty, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 89, 90 (2006). 
 5. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 221–25; Lynn M. LoPucki, 
Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. 
REV. 696, 716–17 (1999). 
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Mevorach).6 There is also his argument regarding universalism’s inabil-
ity to pick a jurisdiction-selecting choice of law rule,7 although the in-
creasing prevalence of the center of main interests (COMI) test has un-
dermined this pessimism somewhat.8 But the most vociferous attack of 
late—perhaps inspired by LoPucki’s path-breaking work on domestic 
forum shopping—revolves around universalism’s purported potential to 
facilitate, and even exacerbate, what he denigrates as transnational bank-
ruptcy “forum shopping.”9 Indeed, this allegation prompted a spirited 
written debate just last year between Professor LoPucki and Ninth Cir-
cuit Bankruptcy Judge (and scholarly author) Samuel Bufford in the 
pages of the American Bankruptcy Law Journal.10 
The purpose of this Article is to take issue with LoPucki’s characteri-
zation of universalism as a harbinger of rampant forum shopping. This is 
not to imply that Judge Bufford’s response was lacking. On the contrary, 
Bufford makes some excellent points and, even more interestingly, pro-
poses specific doctrinal recommendations to shore up the areas where 
universalist instruments might tempt forum shoppers.11 The goal of my 
contribution to the literature is to take a slightly broader, more theoretical 
response than Bufford’s in defending universalism against accusations of 
                                                                                                             
 6. See Irit Mevorach, The Road to a Suitable and Comprehensive Global Approach 
to Insolvencies Within Multinational Corporate Groups, 15 NORTON J. BANK. L. & PRAC. 
455 (2006). 
 7. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 217–21; LoPucki, Universal-
ism Unravels, supra note 2, at 143–44. 
 8. COMI’s robustness is seen by its adoption across a number of international insol-
vency instruments (e.g, the EU Insolvency Regulation, the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Code), as well its carriage into other commercial areas as a func-
tioning jurisdiction-selecting rule. For example, the Cape Town Receivables Convention 
uses the COMI of the assignor as a choice of law rule. Convention on International Inter-
ests in Mobile Equipment ch. xxiv, art. 1(ii), Nov. 16, 2001, available at 
http://www.dgca.nic.in/int_conv/Chap_XXIV.pdf. COMI is here to stay. 
 9. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 200. “The potential for economic 
harm from international forum shopping is greater than the potential for harm from do-
mestic shopping. . . . . If [universalists] succeed, they will unleash the international sys-
tem’s full potential for harm.” Id. at 207. 
 10. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control?, 79 AM. BANK. L.J. 79 (2005); 
Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki, 
79 AM. BANK. L.J. 105 (2005) [hereinafter Bufford, Global Venue Controls]; LoPucki, 
Universalism Unravels, supra note 2. 
 11. Bufford’s recommendations include adding a temporal “domicile” qualifier to 
COMI and a due process-animated probationary period to an initial COMI determination. 
See Bufford, Global Venue Controls, supra note 10, at 133, 139. LoPucki, in fairness, 
replies with some problems with the Bufford proposals (some of which are well taken 
and some of which are overstated, but that is a topic for another day). See LoPucki, Uni-
versalism Unravels, supra note 2. 
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fostering forum shopping. I also take a more pointed stance by contend-
ing that not only is universalism’s capacity to encourage forum shopping 
misunderstood and overstated—a myth—but that territorialism’s poten-
tial for forum shopping has hitherto escaped unnoticed and may be much 
worse. 
The analysis proceeds by first considering the theoretical prerequisite 
to forum shopping—choice of law predictability—and contends that ter-
ritorialism is worse for forum shopping on that ground.12 It then dis-
cusses the second condition—manipulability—and again expresses con-
cerns with territorialism. It finally explores what it calls the “real” cross-
border bankruptcy forum shopping: inter-system arbitrage between terri-
torialist and universalist courts in a world of both types of jurisdictions. 
While acknowledging that this is the exclusive fault of neither territorial-
ism nor universalism, the analysis suggests that universalism’s recent 
legislative efforts, such as Chapter 15, have made strides to combat the 
problem. The discussion concludes with final reflections. 
II. FORUM SHOPPING’S THEORETICAL PREREQUISITE: PREDICTABILITY 
For purposes of this discussion, the reader is presumed to know the dif-
ferences between the universalism and territorialism paradigms, includ-
ing their respective “modified” cognates.13 At an important level, these 
two paradigms can be seen as endorsing competing private international 
law rules regarding the selection of governing bankruptcy law in cross-
border proceedings.14 Territorialism follows the lex situs rule of having 
the substantive bankruptcy law derive from the physical location of each 
of the bankrupt’s assets. Universalism follows, generally (but not pre-
cisely), the lex fora idea of the bankruptcy law deriving from the location 
of the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding (assuming that that proceeding is 
in the debtor’s “home” jurisdiction). The arguments as to which choice 
of law regime is normatively preferable have been well developed in 
                                                                                                             
 12. See infra note 20 on the diction choice of “prerequisite.” 
 13. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies 
Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Re-
solving Transnational Insolvencies].  
 14. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 200–04 (generalizing that 
courts apply their own bankruptcy “laws, procedures, and priorities” but recognizing that 
this is not invariably so “at the margins”); see also Stonington Partners v. Lernout & 
Hauspie Speech Prods., 310 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2002) (Belgian and U.S. courts insisting on 
application of their own bankruptcy laws in parallel proceedings); In re Treco, 240 F.3d. 
148, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting deference to Bahamian proceeding due to dissimi-
larity of its bankruptcy law). 
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previous scholarship.15 One advantage that universalists repeatedly trot 
out is that their rule yields more “predictability” (and hence efficiency) 
from the ex ante perspective of lenders: lenders have no need to follow 
assets around the world to keep track of shifting governing law; they 
know that if they lend to a Canadian-centered business, Canadian bank-
ruptcy law will govern the adjudication of all assets everywhere in the 
event of financial distress.16 
The universalists are generally correct in their claim to greater predict-
ability, at least on a theoretical level (the sheer number of applicable 
bankruptcy laws under a territorial regime almost makes the case on its 
own). Yet they should not necessarily trumpet their predictability so en-
thusiastically for at least two reasons. First, as we shall see, while on a 
theoretical level universalism should yield greater predictability than 
territorialism, as it has been operationalized (through the Model Law, 
Chapter 15, and so on), that potential predictability has been curtailed.17 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, celebration of “predictability” may 
actually be misguided, especially in a world now sensitive to the per-
ceived evils of forum shopping.18 
This second point may be heresy to many bankruptcy readers—to 
question the holy grail of “predictability.”19 But for all the encomium 
predictability receives by scholars in our community, its seedy under-
belly needs to be exposed to have a meaningful and frank discussion of 
bankruptcy forum shopping. This is due to the straightforward but never-
theless important point that predictability is a necessary prerequisite to 
forum shopping.20 If “case placers”21 do not know which forum’s laws 
                                                                                                             
 15. See, e.g., Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies, supra note 13. 
 16. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universal-
ism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2208 (2000); Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multi-
national Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2292–93 (2000). Note that if the universalism 
vs. territorialism contest is collapsed into a choice-of-law debate, then the “predictability” 
benefits of universalism are chronologically upstreamed, such that universalists contend 
transactional planners will know which insolvency law will govern distribution and prior-
ity if and when the debtor ever files for bankruptcy.  
 17. Cf. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 158–63 (arguing that territo-
rialism accords greater predictability than universalism as implemented). 
 18. See infra Part VIII (discussing normative desirability of forum shopping). 
 19. LoPucki aptly needles that “predictability,” when used by bankruptcy case plac-
ers, is sometimes nothing more than a codeword for “case placer solicitude.” LOPUCKI, 
COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 249–50. 
 20. See Nita Ghei and Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Fo-
rum Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1373 
(2004) (“[U]ncertainty about which jurisdiction’s law applies would actually reduce fo-
rum shopping.”); see also Kaplow, infra note 36 (noting that predictable rules regarding 
form make fraud easier for transactional planners and hence that “standards may be pref-
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will apply to a filed bankruptcy case, they cannot shop that case for at-
tractive law.22 Indeed, this is likely the animation behind random as-
                                                                                                             
erable in some contexts”). Strictly speaking, “prerequisite” may technically be an over-
statement. One can always forum shop, even in a highly unpredictable choice of law en-
vironment; the uncertainty costs, however, associated with shopping will rise with unpre-
dictability and may eventually cross a prohibitive threshold. At the absolute case, the 
proposition of a prerequisite holds: it is impossible to forum shop (at least for law) if 
knowledge of applicable law is unavailable. This semantic qualification duly noted, I will 
continue to deem predictability a “prerequisite” to forum shopping. 
 21. This is LoPucki’s term. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 249. 
 22. As mentioned, see supra note 20, this statement characterizes the absolute case at 
the extreme: if choice of law is truly random, forum shopping is impossible. Relaxing 
that extremism, if we say merely that the choice of law rule is “highly unpredictable,” 
then forum shopping, while not impossible, is “highly risky,” because that unpredictabil-
ity undermines the transactional planner’s efforts to select desired law. Compare a more 
predictable choice of law rule (the forum selected by the parties to the contract) to a more 
unpredictable one (the forum selected by the parties to the contract, if appropriate). The 
forum shoppers in the second case are uneasier than their first case counterparts because 
they face the risk that their desired choice will be unsettled. A middlingly predictable rule 
(the forum selected by the parties to the contract, unless manifestly contrary to the public 
policies of the lex fori concursus) would be of correspondingly middling comfort to the 
forum shopper. Thus, along this simple axis of analysis, more predictability is preferable 
to putative forum shoppers, in part because it gets ex post judges out of their hair. 
  Now complicate matters by relaxing the assumption of objective judges dispas-
sionately interpreting a choice of law rule and inject case-scroungers of the sorts over 
which Professor LoPucki (and not without reason) frets. In that case, diminished predict-
ability—at least if arising through ambiguity in the choice of law rule—may actually 
foment, rather than discourage, forum shopping. Take a highly ambiguous rule (the fair-
est jurisdiction’s laws to resolve the contractual dispute). Such a rule might inspire case 
placers, in an environment of solicitous judges, to seek friendly courts with any plausible 
argument that their desired forum is the fairest. Here, the forum shopping is focused less 
on upstream transactional planning and more on ex post filing in a desired courtroom. 
The ambiguity of the choice of law rule gives the case placers cover in this competitive 
judicial environment and hence actually facilitates their shopping impulses. Ironically, to 
cabin the discretion of these judges requires clearer, more predictable rules—rules that 
unfortunately offer clear guidance to the upstream transactional planner seeking to shop 
for attractive law. See also infra text accompanying note 31 (discussing difference be-
tween jurisdiction-selecting rule’s exclusivity and clarity). 
  This Article proceeds on the simplifying assumption of judicial objectivity and 
hence of unpredictability generally working to frustrate forum shopping, see Ghei & 
Parisi, supra note 20, but the reason for this assumption is more expositional ease and 
aspired clarity than substantive rejection of Professor LoPucki’s corruption concerns (a 
debate I defer major participation in for a later day). As I do mention briefly below, how-
ever, see infra notes 50 and 111, although I think Professor LoPucki uncovers a serious 
problem in the U.S. domestic venue rules, he and I diverge when we turn to the interna-
tional front, both because of the exclusivity of the COMI rule in contrast to the multiplic-
ity of the domestic venue rules, and, more relevant to the instant issue, because of our 
differing assessments of the vagueness of the COMI rule. I openly admit that the COMI 
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signment in bankruptcy venues with multiple judges, such as the South-
ern District of New York, where the clerk “spins the wheel” in assigning 
which judge will sit on a case after its filing: a presumable effort to di-
minish intra-district judge shopping. If an international debtor had to spin 
a wheel to determine which bankruptcy law would apply in the event it 
filed for reorganization, forum shopping would be very difficult indeed. 
To be sure, lenders might be horrified by such a system—the death of 
predictability!—and they would consequently add a hefty legal risk pre-
mium in pricing credit, but it would certainly end forum shopping as we 
know it (or at least sublimate it into wheel-spinner bribing). Accordingly, 
concern about forum shopping cannot proceed in the absence of a recog-
nition that a necessary prerequisite is predictability and, therefore, that 
there is an inherent trade-off between predictability, which is tradition-
ally viewed positively in bankruptcy circles, and “shopability,” which is 
presumably more negative.23 
This relationship between predictability and forum shopping means 
that earlier territorialist criticism of the imperfections of universalism’s 
choice of law rules may actually, and perhaps ironically, be praise for a 
certain flexibility that may inhibit forum shopping.24 As will be dis-
cussed below, the very genius of the universalist COMI rule is its fact-
sensitivity. While it sacrifices a degree of clarity, it comes at the gain of 
an ability to stifle putative forum shoppers. This dawning realization may 
be why territorialists have changed the thrust of their critique in trying to 
discredit universalism. Initially, territorialists complained that proposed 
jurisdiction-selecting rules under universalism, such as COMI, would be 
vague and unpredictable, pointing to the crispness of the competing situs 
rule.25 Now, likely as a result of the new concern about forum shopping, 
                                                                                                             
rule has some unpredictability inherent in it (its juxtaposition to the alternative jurisdic-
tion-selecting rule of place of incorporation exposes this attribute), but see this vagueness 
as limited (“bounded vagueness” perhaps). Professor LoPucki sees the play in the joints 
as much greater and hence much more ominous—perhaps scarcely better than my styl-
ized unpredictable choice of law rule of the “fairest” jurisdiction. See LoPucki, Univers-
alism Unravels, supra note 2, at 143 (“[The COMI] standard is intentionally vague and 
practically meaningless.”).  
 23. Compare the discussion on normative desirability, infra Part VIII. Another neces-
sary prerequisite is meaningful difference in law; one can only shop if one has more than 
one product from which to choose. Cf. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 231 
(worrying that universalism will foment, undesirably in his view, substantive harmoniza-
tion of bankruptcy laws). 
 24. See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 143. 
 25. See, e.g., Frederick Tung, Skepticism About Universalism: International Bank-
ruptcy and International Relations 1, (Berkeley Program in L. & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 43, 2002), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/43. 
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the tone has changed: denigration of universalism’s difficulty in crafting 
a choice of law rule has been replaced with concern over the ease with 
which the universalist COMI rule has taken grip and will undergird a 
pandemic of forum shopping.26 
III. UNIVERSALISM VS. TERRITORIALISM’S “PREDICTABILITY” 
REGARDING CHOICE OF LAW 
Ten years ago, there was still debate over which choice of law rule 
would anchor a universalist paradigm (place of incorporation? location 
of most assets?). Now, it is clear that COMI has emerged the winner. But 
what is COMI? Is it a bright-line rule? A standard? A mid-point along a 
rule-standard continuum? If a mid-point, where precisely does it lie?27 
LoPucki at times equates home country with place of incorporation, ren-
dering the impression that they are interchangeable.28 They are not.29 
They are quite distinct—importantly, in a manner that implicates the fo-
rum-shopping attribute of “predictability.” While one may call COMI a 
rule, to call it a “bright line” would probably be a stretch, even for its 
proponents.30 To be clear, this is not a comment on the rule’s exclusivity. 
                                                                                                             
 26. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 210–12 (chronicling universal-
ism’s growing acceptance); id. at 217–218 (“All the case placer need do to forum shop in 
a universalist system is make a plausible argument that the chosen court is at the centre of 
the debtor’s main interests.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); LoPucki, 
Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 147–48. In other words, in the earlier, more ab-
stract academic discussions, territorialists doubted universalists would be able to get their 
act together sufficiently to agree upon a jurisdiction-selecting rule (would they pick in-
corporation? Location of major assets? COMI?). Now that COMI has emerged trium-
phant, the territorialist concern seems to be that the forum shopper has clear guidance and 
hence an easy task. Knowing the dominant rule, he can take steps to establish or move his 
COMI in or into a preferred jurisdiction.  
 27. Presumably at the middle, but nobody likes a smartass. Cf. FLETCH (Universal 
Pictures 1985) (“Fletch: Well, we’re in kind of a grey area. Frank: How grey? Fletch: 
Charcoal.”). 
 28. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 196 (“[T]hroughout most of the 
world, a debtor corporation’s country of incorporation is considered an appropriate 
venue—if not the appropriate venue—for the corporation’s bankruptcy case.”); id. at 198 
(listing place of incorporation as “one of the three tests commonly applied” to determine 
home country); id. at 218 (listing place of incorporation as one of four plausible bases for 
COMI that is “routinely” accepted). 
 29. See id. at 218 (conceding that “[i]f incorporation is the debtor’s only contact with 
the forum country, the [COMI] argument may not be plausible”). 
 30. For example, Professor Jay Westbrook defends its clarity, but with circumspect 
language:  
[T]the principal place of business standard in one formulation or another is 
commonplace throughout American law—state and federal—and is found else-
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That is, there should be one and only one “center” of main interests. But 
exclusivity and clarity are different.31 Consider, as a hypothetical, that 
universalism selected controlling bankruptcy law as the “fairest” jurisdic-
tion to administer the debtor’s global assets.32 Only one jurisdiction can 
be the fairest of them all (an exclusive criterion), but surely fairness is 
less akin to a rule than a standard (a malleable criterion). The same com-
parison holds in differentiating COMI33 from its logical rival, place of 
incorporation. Universalism could have selected the governing bank-
ruptcy law by the much brighter-line test of the place of the debtor’s in-
corporation. Such a decision would have resulted in considerably more 
predictability.34 (Indeed, underscoring the nexus between clarity of rule 
and forum shopping capability is corporate law’s internal affairs doc-
trine, which determines applicable substantive corporate law by place of 
incorporation; only with such a clear foundation choice of law rule can 
there be a meaningful jurisdictional “race,” either to the top or the bot-
tom.)35 Yet universalism did not pick place of incorporation as its juris-
                                                                                                             
where as well. That sort of standard has produced some litigation, but I am un-
aware of any widely held view that it is so imprecise as to be impractical or to 
maim any important legal objective. The center-of-main-interests standard was 
adopted in the EU Convention and the Model Law, with no substantial claim 
asserted that the standard was too difficult to enforce. A similar standard has 
been applied by the United States courts in applying section 304 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code in the choice of forum context without provoking substantial liti-
gation.  
Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 16, at 2316. Other scholars are less enthusiastic. 
See IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 260 (1999); Ian F. Fletcher, Maintaining the Momentum: 
The Continuing Quest for Global Standards and Principles to Govern Cross-Border In-
solvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 767 (2007). For an atypical case, but an interesting one, 
struggling with a difficult-to-determine COMI, see In Re Bank of Credit and Commerce 
Int’l SA, [1996] 4 All E.R. 796 (U.K.); In re Bank of Credit & Commerce International 
S.A. (No. 2) [1992] B.C.L.C. 715 (U.K.) [hereinafter BCCI]. 
 31. Although, to be sure, they may be related. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 16, at 
2207 n.113 (suggesting that exclusivity of home country rule would enhance clarity). 
 32. Compare the interest-based choice of law analysis from Restatement (Second) of 
Choice of Law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). 
 33. The U.S. civil procedure analogue is “principal place of business.” 
 34. LoPucki indirectly touches on this when he argues that multiple plausible claims 
exist to COMI. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 217–18; see also Luca 
Enriques and Martin Gelter, Regulatory Competition in European Company Law and 
Creditor Protection, 7 EUROP. B. ORG. L. R. 417, 431 (2006) (describing COMI as 
“fuzz[y]”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 35. See G. Marcus Cole, Delaware Is Not a State: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional 
Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L.REV. 1845, 1857–58 (2002) (canvassing corpo-
rate law “racing” literature and critiquing its applicability to purported “Delawarization” 
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diction-selecting rule. Instead, it opted for COMI, a more fact-dependent 
“standardish” criterion.36 
To be sure, a debtor’s place of incorporation is not independent from 
its COMI. Indeed, it is closely related. For example, under Chapter 15, 
the Model Law, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, COMI is legally pre-
sumed to be at a corporate debtor’s registered office (i.e., its place of in-
corporation).37 But precisely because the presumption is rebuttable, 
COMI and incorporation are only usually, but not always, in the same 
place. Thus courts are invited to consider instances in which the brass 
plate (or “file drawer”)38 corporate office points to COMI in one jurisdic-
tion on a bright-line, formalistic analysis, but a functional, realistic in-
quiry of business contacts finds COMI elsewhere.39 In other words, the 
presumption of COMI being place of incorporation is rebutted when the 
incorporation location is a mere sham, which is a robust proxy for when 
a corporate debtor is shopping for attractive applicable law.40 Accord-
                                                                                                             
of corporate reorganizations); see also Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies, 
supra note 13, discussed infra Part VIII. 
 36. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 618 & n.180 (1992) (arguing that laws relating to form should be predictable but 
noting that fraud may be “easier to commit if there are known rigid rules that a fraudulent 
actor can carefully circumvent” such that “standards may be preferable in some con-
texts”); see generally id. at 562 (defining determinations as “standard-like” if their con-
tent is filled subsequent to relevant conduct). For European authors calling COMI a 
“standard,” see Enriques & Gelter, supra note 34, at 419. 
 37. See 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (2007); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 1, art. 16.3; 
EU Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3.1. 
 38. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 195. 
 39. These sorts of “letterbox” companies were of express concern to the European 
Court of Justice, which issued an opinion offering some interpretative guidance to the 
COMI rule. See Case 341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-3813, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.itm. For an excellent analysis of these pro-
ceedings, see Samuel L. Bufford, Center of Main Interests, International Insolvency Case 
Venue, and Equality of Arms: The Eurofood Decision of the European Court of Justice. 
27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 351 (2007). 
 40. Consider as a comparison the “real seat” doctrine used in some civil law systems 
in which a corporation is governed under the laws of its “real seat” (which would likely 
translate into “principal place of business” as U.S. analogue), regardless of its place of 
incorporation. See Gabriel Moss, Group Insolvency—Choice of Forum and Law: The 
European Experience Under the Influence of English Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
1005 (2007); Nick Segal, The Effect of Reorganisation Proceedings on Security Interests: 
the Position under English and US Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 927 (2007); Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1019 (2007). 
For example, companies often try to select into the tax laws of havens by “reincorpo-
rat[ing]” and setting up “nominal headquarters.” LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra 
note 2, at 199 (discussing tax-animated expatriation of Commodore International decades 
before its ultimate bankruptcy). It is doubtful the Bahamas could be Commodore’s 
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ingly, viewing COMI and the incorporation presumption together, a 
more accurate way of casting the jurisdiction-selecting choice of law rule 
of the Model Law and its universalist progeny is that the choice of law 
rule actually is place of incorporation, but that the rule is subject to an 
important anti-forum-shopping caveat: that the place of incorporation 
house the debtor’s COMI.41 In this regard, rather than view Daisytek and 
similar cases as the “unraveling” of the COMI system,42 I see them as the 
vindication of a realistic approach to place of incorporation as a baseline 
choice of law rule for universalism. It works well as a jurisdiction-
selecting criterion for most cases, but cannot stand when it points to a 
                                                                                                             
COMI, which seems to prove the point that haven-induced incorporations may work for 
bright-line tax rules but not for COMI-based universalism. 
 41. Miguel Virgós & Etienne Schmit, Report on the Convention on Insolvency Pro-
ceedings, in THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENTARY AND 
ANNOTATED GUIDE 263, 281 (Gabriel Moss, Ian F. Fletcher & Stuart Isaacs eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter Virgós-Schmit Report] (“The concept of ‘centre of main interests’ must be 
interpreted as the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a 
regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties.”); see also EU Regulation, 
supra note 1, recital 13, at 2 (replicating Virgós & Schmit’s language). 
 42. Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., [2003] B.C.C. 562 (Ch. D) (U.K.); see also LoPucki, Uni-
versalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 150 (criticizing Daisytek as illustration of courts’ 
inclination to hoard jurisdiction). In Daisytek, the Leeds court found the United Kingdom 
to be the COMI of each of the European subsidiary corporations, notwithstanding many 
incorporations on the Continent, because most of the suppliers and creditors who did 
business with them negotiated contracts with the British head office in Bradford and 
hence expected to be subject to British commercial law. Thus, the vindication of credi-
tors’ expectations was important in determining COMI. An interesting hypothetical 
would be to ask whether the United States (home of the corporate grandparent and great-
grandparent) could have been the COMI of these French and German subsidiaries. Here, 
the answer is probably not under the most recent thinking of universalists, who are mov-
ing toward crafting an “economic integration” test as a principled means to combat the 
nettlesome question of corporate groups. See Mevorach, supra note 6 (exploring, in 115 
pages of painstaking detail, insolvency considerations of cross-border corporate groups, 
including, inter alia, the role corporate letterhead should play in mediating the expecta-
tions of creditors). Mevorach’s formulations are beyond the scope of this Article; suffice 
it to say she rolls up her sleeves and confronts some of the difficult obstacles territorial-
ists challenge are insurmountable in allocating jurisdiction among corporate affiliates 
under universalism. Thus, for example, were Toyota’s U.S. subsidiary ever to file for 
bankruptcy, the question whether its COMI would be in the United States or Japan would 
depend “dominantly,” in Mevorach’s estimation, on whether its financial affairs were 
interwoven with the parent (in an analysis reminiscent of substantive consolidation in 
domestic U.S. insolvency law; for a recent treatment, see In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 
195 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1910 (2006)) and whether that interconnection 
were readily detectible to outside creditors.  
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jurisdiction other than a debtor’s COMI, because such aberration reeks of 
(presumably unwelcome)43 forum shopping. 
By contrast, territorialism’s choice of law rule is unrelenting in its 
brightness: it is where the assets are physically located on the nanosec-
ond of bankruptcy. There is neither qualification nor caveat. That pre-
dictability, of course, comes at the cost of clear guidance to the putative 
forum shopper. There is no “presumption” in the way that registered of-
fice is only presumed to be a debtor’s COMI. The asset’s physical loca-
tion is more analogous as a legal construct to the debtor’s place of incor-
poration than to its COMI. Accordingly, a more apt comparison to the 
COMI rule would be if territorialism chose law based on the asset’s 
“abode,” which could be presumed to be its place of physical location. 
Yet this is exactly the sort of qualification that is anathema to the sim-
plicity sought by the territorialist model.44 To be sure, there are necessar-
ily some cases in which uncertainty might arise as to asset location,45 but 
we have no reason to think they will be common. In the main, territorial-
ism thrives on its purported choice of law clarity and predictability; con-
sequently, it must acknowledge its concomitant invitation, at least re-
garding these attributes, to forum shoppers. 
Two conclusions flow from this suggestion that territorialism leads to 
the clearer (or more “predictable”) choice of law rule—at least as uni-
versalism has been currently implemented with the COMI 
rule/incorporation presumption. First, universalism is not as clear in its 
choice of law ambitions as its proponents would like to say it is.46 I say 
this as an unabashed universalist.47 Again, one need only point to the 
                                                                                                             
 43. See normativity discussion, infra Part VIII. 
 44. See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 160 (“Cooperative territori-
ality can provide greater predictability [because of the clear rule that] bankruptcy admini-
stration of a multinational’s assets and operations within a given country is governed by 
the laws of that country.”). The advantage of this rigidity, in its supporters’ eyes, is that it 
permits one and only one country—that of the asset’s location—to enforce legal control 
through force. Yet when concerns arise over asset flight, qualifications to this simplicity 
become necessary: agreement is now required between more than one country—the 
abode jurisdiction and the situs jurisdiction—and so exclusive reliance on the use of force 
by one country alone, so valued by territorialist theory, is no longer possible. See also 
infra text accompanying notes 115–18. 
 45. See, e.g., Underwood v. Hilliard (In re Rimsat, LTD), 98 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“[Rimsat’s] principal place of business is in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Most of its fi-
nancial assets are there, but its nonfinancial assets, principally leaseholds in satellites, 
have no terrestrial site.”). 
 46. See supra note 30. 
 47. In this regard, I somewhat agree with Professor LoPucki’s claim that the COMI 
rule (compared to territorialism’s situs rule) is a “vague” standard. LOPUCKI, COURTING 
FAILURE, supra note 2, at 221. He’s right, and it would behoove universalists to admit it. 
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declined alternative of place of incorporation as the universalism choice 
of law rule to appreciate the foregone clarity. As an olive branch to win 
my way back into the universalism fold, I offer the further observation 
that while territorialism, as implemented, has the clearer choice of law 
rule, that is only a rule for asset-by-asset adjudication. The cumulative 
consequence of these multiple (clearer) choices of bankruptcy law may 
be, for example, that there are seven applicable bankruptcy laws to one 
multinational debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings. That may result in confu-
sion and expensive legal knowledge costs—the foundational sort of un-
predictability that universalists (rightly) bemoan. Moreover, as men-
tioned, this lack of predictability to the choice of law rule—or, more pre-
cisely, this sub-maximal, but perhaps optimal, level of predictability to 
the choice of law rule—is not anything over which universalists should 
fret. It could well be a sensible retrenchment from predictability to ad-
dress concerns of forum shopping. 
The second point is an elaboration regarding the proposition that the 
brighter the choice of law rule, the more manipulable it is by strategic 
venue-seekers. As mentioned, predictability of the choice of law rule is a 
necessary condition—a prerequisite—to forum shopping, but it may not 
be a sufficient one. While there is likely a high correlation between the 
clarity of the rule and its ease of manipulation in forum shopping,48 it is 
at least theoretically possible to envision a rule that is clear but difficult 
to exploit—due to, for example, high costs. For example, one can (un-
healthily) imagine a clear, bright rule regarding choice of bankruptcy 
law—the jurisdiction in which the debtor’s president has bludgeoned the 
most puppies—that, while clear, may not actually be that “manipulable” 
due to inordinate reputational costs or other concerns. Thus while the 
predictability aspect of territorialism points toward more prevalent forum 
shopping, a second question remains open whether the rule, while clear, 
                                                                                                             
Where we universalists should dig in, however, is on the normative desirability of that 
indeterminacy. If indeterminacy dampens forum shopping, and if forum shopping is per-
nicious, then the vagueness may be nothing to fear. Nor should we should despair that 
this vagueness will condemn commercial transactions to a quagmire of uncertainty. It is 
“bounded vagueness” at worst. See supra note 22. As Jay Westbrook correctly observes, 
the relevant subset of possible jurisdictions is likely to be a small one. See infra note 61. 
Thus creditors will know ex ante which laws will apply for most cases and will face only 
a small zone of possibilities for the marginal ones. They fare no worse than having to 
calculate the probabilities of asset movement in lending transactions under territorialism. 
 48. See Guzman, supra note 16, at 2207 (“[A] test based on place of incorporation 
would be inappropriate. A test such as the principal place of business, on the other hand, 
is much more difficult for the debtor to manipulate.”). 
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can be easily manipulated.49 And the more pointed comparative question 
is whether the rule is any more manipulable than universalism’s alterna-
tive of COMI. 
IV. UNIVERSALISM VS. TERRITORIALISM’S MANIPULABILITY 
REGARDING CHOICE OF LAW 
The answer to the question whether it is easier to manipulate the choice 
of law rules in universalism or territorialism ultimately boils down to an 
empirical inquiry whether it is easier to move a debtor’s COMI or its as-
sets.50 To “shop” for favorable bankruptcy law, a decisionmaker would 
have to shift (or establish) the debtor’s COMI under universalism into (or 
in) the jurisdiction—the self-styled haven—with the attractive law. By 
contrast, under territorialism, the debtor would need to move (or situate) 
the assets into (or in) the favored jurisdiction. Which is easier? In his 
book and other recent scholarly writings, Professor LoPucki, perhaps 
building on earlier expressed suspicions,51 assumes that it is virtually 
effortless for a sophisticated global actor with fancy lawyers to move its 
COMI.52 He presents several examples of bankruptcy proceedings where 
he contends this has happened.53 But what he does not explore in any 
                                                                                                             
 49. In sum, it is a two-dimensional interaction. Conceivably, a clear but difficult-to-
manipulate choice of law rule could result in less total forum shopping than a fuzzier but 
easier to manipulate one. (The two vectors may not be fully orthogonal, thus further 
complicating the analysis.) Cf. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 208 (“Uni-
versalists and their opponents agree that a system that allowed multinational companies a 
last-minute choice of law would not be viable.”). See also supra note 22. 
 50. This is a distinct issue from the amenability of judges to seize or retain cases once 
a case placer selects her courtroom. Unlike domestic U.S. bankruptcy venue, see 28 
U.S.C. § 1408, in which multiple, parallel permissible bases of venue exist—and hence 
for which there can be a wide pool of judicial suitors for corporate case placers—the 
COMI standard for allocating primary jurisdiction is an exclusive criterion. There can be 
only one COMI (just as, under territorialism, there can be only one location of an asset). 
Case placers do not get to pick from the broad array of options they enjoy under U.S. 
domestic venue rules. 
 51. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996).  
 52. See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 155–58 (“Regardless which 
characteristics of a company determine a multinational’s COMI, the multinational can 
easily change them. . . .”). For an interesting analysis about how many COMIs in Europe 
would actually engage substantial costs and “severe obstacles,” see Enriques & Gelter, 
supra note 34. 
 53. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 226–30. Note that one of his 
key examples, Derby Cycle, was a case of value-maximizing corporate divestiture of a 
profitable Dutch subsidiary that no party in subsequent litigation (at least to my knowl-
edge) ever suggested was animated by forum shopping. True, it shows how a COMI can 
arguably change after a major corporate divestiture, but COMI-shift as an ancillary result 
of the return-maximizing sale of an economically discrete foreign division should not 
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depth is the corollary issue: the ease with which sophisticated global ac-
tors can shift their assets. (His brief consideration of movable assets 
speculates that they are likely to constitute a small portion of the debtor’s 
estate, to be slow-moving, and to be highly visible to outsiders; he con-
sequently dismisses asset movement as a concern.)54 
I do not presume to offer an answer to this empirical question, as that 
would require an empirical study, which I have not done.55 I will, how-
ever, offer two reflections. First, I will challenge LoPucki’s inherent as-
sumption that moving COMI involves little more than clever paper shuf-
fling.56 While moving place of incorporation requires only glorified pa-
perwork, moving COMI, by definition, requires more.57 Indeed, this is 
the very reason why registered office is merely a presumption of COMI. 
Eve-of-bankruptcy re-incorporation would likely be the quintessential 
example of when the presumption would be rebutted. The closest exam-
ple to a fast-paced move of COMI—not just of incorporation—in the 
transnational insolvency setting of which I am aware involved BCCI.58  
                                                                                                             
cause distress. See also LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 160 (recogniz-
ing not all asset or COMI movement is nefarious). Indeed, for a very recent example 
where both German and U.K. courts agreed that the COMI of a German construction 
company that had been swallowed up by a U.K. investment conglomerate (including its 
“delisting” as a separate corporation) did not shift COMI from Germany to the United 
Kingdom, see Hans Brochier Holdings Ltd. EWiR2007, 177; NZI2007, 187 (U.K. pro-
ceedings before High Court in London); EWiR2007, 177, ZIP2007, 81; NZI2007, 185 
(German proceedings before Insolvency Court at Nuremberg). 
 54. See id at 160–61. 
 55. There is an interesting corpus of empirical research on domestic forum shopping 
outside the bankruptcy context. For two recent offerings, see Kevin M. Clermont & 
Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507 
(1995) (analyzing Administrative Office of U.S. Courts data to find 58% win rate of fed-
eral civil cases tried in their court of origin versus 29% win rate in venue-transferred 
cases); Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. 
REV. 1 (1998) (analyzing 1,000 published federal appellate and state supreme court cases 
to find that most plaintiffs file suit—be it in federal or state court—in their state of resi-
dence). Cf. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 160 (acknowledging that 
some COMI shifts are innocent). 
 56. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 229 (“But even the multinational’s 
center of assets and operations can be changed—without moving any assets and opera-
tions.”); id. at 230–31 (“[T]he ability of both corporations and corporate groups to 
quickly and easily relocate make forum shopping easy in a universalist system.”). 
 57. It is by definition because COMI is only rebuttably presumed (not irrebuttably 
presumed) to be the place of incorporation. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (2007). 
 58. BCCI is LoPucki’s strongest example. See Re Bank of Credit and Commerce Int’l 
SA, [1996] 4 All E.R. 796 (U.K.). Other examples he offers of shifted COMIs are less 
compelling for a variety of reasons. For example, in Fruit of the Loom, the COMI (argua-
bly) moved years before bankruptcy. In Singer, the COMI of a far-flung operation with 
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BCCI was a Luxembourg-incorporated global banking and investment 
empire with main offices in London. Shortly before mounting fraud 
made bankruptcy inevitable, the principal decision-makers decamped 
London for their home back in the United Arab Emirates. Thus while the 
operations back office of the empire stayed in London, the key “brains” 
had moved home. Consequently, the COMI of this far-flung organization 
possibly moved just before bankruptcy, or at the very least it became 
more ambiguous. Indeed, BCCI’s main insolvency proceeding was actu-
ally opened in neither the United Kingdom nor the United Arab Emir-
ates; it was opened of all places in Luxembourg. The United Kingdom—
the presumably aggrieved “rival” jurisdiction by the case’s opening in 
Luxembourg—went along by recognizing the Luxembourg main pro-
ceeding and pseudo-cooperating.59 Even under these facts, however, it is 
still not clear BCCI’s COMI moved on short notice. What happened is 
that an already unstable COMI of a far-flung investment and banking 
empire was rendered even more unstable by a last-minute move of per-
sonnel. Indeed, note that it was never suggested in the litigation that 
COMI (to be sure a counter-factual, as the term was not even used at the 
time) moved from London to the Mideast. Rather, the move had the nar-
rower effect of “de-selecting” the United Kingdom by making its argu-
able case for COMI weaker. Moreover, as LoPucki himself concedes, the 
movement of the principals was not an attempt to forum shop bankruptcy 
law but an attempt to flee criminal personal jurisdiction.60 Thus, the 
worst-case possible example of COMI-shopping available in published 
opinions (again, COMI-shopping, not mere re-incorporation) demon-
                                                                                                             
assets and workers in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia was (in LoPucki’s esti-
mation) moved from the Netherlands Antilles to the United States by a post-bankruptcy 
U.S. reincorporation. But LoPucki himself admits that Singer had hired a new CEO in 
New York who was trying to run the global enterprise from U.S. headquarters well before 
bankruptcy. Indeed, it was by no means clear that the Netherlands Antilles-incorporated 
holding company didn’t have its COMI in the United States already. See LOPUCKI, 
COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 227–28. My point is not to spar with LoPucki on a 
case-by-case basis; on the contrary, I am actually trying to find the case that makes his 
argument best for him—BCCI—and confront it head on. 
 59. The pseudo-cooperation was because after a back-and-forth litigation regarding 
the jurisdiction and discretionary powers of bankruptcy judges in the United Kingdom, 
the British administrators cooperated with Luxembourg after holding back certain assets 
to satisfy (presumably mostly British) set-off claimants whose claims would not have 
been recognized under Luxembourg law. Re Bank of Credit and Commerce Int’l SA, 
[1996] 4 All E.R. 796 (U.K.). Indeed, the British administrators tried to cooperate with 
Luxembourg and were apparently broadsided by their own court, which in its voluminous 
analysis ultimately decided the proposed plan was impermissible under British law. 
 60. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 220. 
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strates at most an ability to destabilize relevant factors within a very nar-
row band of plausible jurisdictions.61 
The second and perhaps more important observation regards the un-
asked (and unanswered) corollary: can assets also be moved relatively 
easily on the eve of bankruptcy? The answer seems to be yes. To be sure, 
hard assets cannot get up and walk away,62 and some highly salient re-
cent cases involve some very hard assets indeed, such as oil refineries.63 
But not all assets are hard. Indeed, in one sector that has spawned a good 
amount of cross-border insolvency work—insurance—most of the assets 
are liquid and hence readily movable.64 To be clear, this is not just about 
cross-border preferences, which are eve-of-bankruptcy asset transfers to 
a favored foreign creditor—although there are plenty of those filling up 
the pages of the bankruptcy reporters.65 This is equally about eve-of-
bankruptcy, intra-debtor transfers across national borders that exploit the 
                                                                                                             
 61. Indeed, Eurofood, Daisytek, et al. show that incorporation in another jurisdiction 
is not enough to move COMI. Much more is required, such as non-trivial exercise of 
decisionmaking or operations. See In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., [2005] 1 I.L.R.M. 161 (Ir.); 
In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., [2003] B.C.C. 562 (Ch. D) (U.K.). As Jay Westbrook points out, 
in many cases where there is serious COMI doubt, the relevant short list is likely to be 
short indeed: “[I]n most countries the standard for locating a corporation on a basis other 
than its place of incorporation is likely to be built on one of two concepts: the corpora-
tion’s headquarters (e.g., ‘chief executive offices’ or ‘real seat’) or its operations (e.g., 
‘principal assets’).” Westbrook, supra note 40, at 1035; see also Enriques & Gelter, su-
pra note 34, at 444 (noting “only a limited number of jurisdictions will be within the set 
of available options”). LoPucki himself recognizes this point. See LOPUCKI, COURTING 
FAILURE, supra note 2, at 218. He simply expresses deep-seated skepticism that judges 
and courts of the incorporation jurisdiction will rebut the presumption vigorously. See id. 
at 219. But cf., e.g., Case C-1/04, Susanne Staubitz-Schrieber, 2006 E.C.R. I-701, dis-
cussed infra notes 126–27. For a very recent transnational insolvency undermining 
LoPucki’s pessimism, consider the Hans Brochier Holdings Ltd. case, litigated in the 
United Kingdom and Germany. There, a German construction company was purchased 
by a U.K. conglomerate and had its corporate status “delisted” and subsumed into the 
U.K. parent. After some false starts, the courts in both Germany and the United Kingdom 
agreed that the COMI was, and always had been, in Germany. See supra note 53. 
 62. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 229 (“Numerous examples in this 
book have already shown the ease with which multinational companies can change their 
place of incorporation and the location of their headquarters. The location of assets and 
operations are more difficult to change.”). 
 63. See, e.g., In re Yukos Oil Co. (Yukos II), No. 06-B-10775-RDD, 2006 WL 
3026024 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006). 
 64. See, e.g., In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Refco-
Inc., 336 B.R. 187 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 65. See, e.g., Maxwell Commc’n Corp. v. Barclays Bank (In re Maxwell Commc’n 
Corp.), 170 B.R. 800, 801 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re A. Tarricone, Inc., 80 B.R. 21, 
22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674, 675 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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choice of law rule of territorialism.66 Global companies can transfer as-
sets before filing for bankruptcy, even if not to any particular creditor. 
And this happens. Consider the recent case of National Warranty Insur-
ance, in which $24 million of its reserves from the United States (where 
it faced some disgruntled creditors) were wired to its accounts in the 
Cayman Islands just before filing for winding up there under Cayman 
law. Accordingly, for highly liquid and mobile assets—which are likely 
to be of the most interest to creditors—it is by no means evident territori-
alism is any less manipulable than universalism.67 In fact, it may be 
more. Assets, at least important assets, may fly as fast as a bank wire.68 
In sum, it is far from clear that universalism’s anchoring choice of law 
rule that has been implemented over the past decade—COMI—provides 
more temptation for jurisdictional mischief than territorialism’s situs 
rule. From the perspective of forum shopping’s necessary prerequisite, 
predictability, COMI’s comparative flexibility (less fashionably, “unpre-
                                                                                                             
 66. The inevitable breaches of covenant by such moves simply add more unsecured 
claims to the bankrupt debtor’s estate—cold comfort for the aggrieved creditors. 
 67. At one point, LoPucki speculates that while assets can move under territorialism, 
at least their movement is “highly visible.” LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 
2, at 160. Leaving aside the unexplained basis for his intuition, I am not sure how much 
comfort that would offer an aggrieved creditor (other than the virtue of seeing the bullet 
coming). In any event, the Virgós-Schmit Report makes clear that COMI is supposed to 
be determined based on objectively ascertainable data to third parties on “where the 
debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis;” covert COMI shifts 
seem definitionally foreclosed. Virgós-Schmit Report, supra note 41, at 281; see also EU 
Regulation, supra note 1, recital 13, at 2 (replicating Virgós-Schmit Report). 
 68. LoPucki initially suggested that international conventions regarding asset return 
could minimize forum shopping under territorialism, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation 
in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 
749 (1999), but has since retreated from that claim, instead pointing to the common law 
hotchpot rule as an indirect policing mechanism. See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 
supra note 2, at 161. Reliance on the hotchpot rule is unpersuasive, because the hotchpot 
rule is a negative injunction, not an affirmative disgorgement remedy. (For an excellent 
analysis of hotchpot, see Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in Trans-
national Insolvencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local Interests, 73 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 385, 429 (1999)). LoPucki’s last-ditch response to forum shopping un-
der territorialism—and I give him great credit for acknowledging the problem and re-
sponding to it—is that courts can always agree to cooperate ex post when they realize it is 
in their best interest. See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 162 (arguing 
that the inducements for cooperation under territorialism are “obvious” because “[i]f the 
assets of the multinational would bring a higher price if sold together, it will be in the 
interests of the administrators to sell them together and split the proceeds among them.”). 
Unfortunately, that response is like saying creditors will agree to forego their individual 
collection rights when they realize it is in their best interests to respond collectively. They 
don’t, and for holdout and other reasons we have a compulsory bankruptcy law. See 
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986). 
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dictability”) renders it less amenable to strategic exploitation. From the 
probably related but theoretically distinct perspective of manipulability, 
COMI is no more changeable than asset location; regarding at least some 
important assets, it may even be less. Taken together, these considera-
tions suggest that the recent alarum of universalism’s purported facilita-
tion of forum shopping may be nothing more than a myth. Moreover, it 
may be displacement. Territorialism may actually create the more fertile 
environment for would-be forum shoppers. 
V. THE REAL FORUM SHOPPING 
The previous discussion has tried to explain why a territorialist system 
might be just as bad as, if not worse, than a universalist system in terms 
of cross-border bankruptcy forum shopping. But that has been a largely 
theoretical discussion—an important one, to be sure, for setting the re-
cord straight, but one that has considered only a conceptually pure re-
gime of either full universalism or full territorialism. This does not re-
flect the current state of the world in 2007. This is not to imply that we 
have yet to see any forum shopping. Far from it. Indeed, there has been 
plenty.69 Rather, the claim is that the problem of today’s forum shop-
ping—the real forum shopping, on the ground—is in cases where the 
current disconnect between universalism and territorialism has been ex-
ploited by savvy litigants. It is this discrepancy in the status quo of the 
incomplete embrace of universalism that has left a lopsided environment, 
with jurisdictional loopholes embedded in the asymmetry. This problem 
is an intrinsic fault of neither universalism nor territorialism.70 It is a 
problem of bankruptcy transition where only some countries are univer-
salist but others remain territorialists. This is where the real forum shop-
ping of today lies. 
Stepping back, one must first define what it means for a country to be 
“universalist” or “territorialist.” After all, these terms refer to a system of 
transnational insolvency administration (on one view, a choice of law 
paradigm), so one country, on its own, can’t technically be anything. It 
can only support the adoption of one private international law regime. 
Nevertheless, states have domestic law cognates to universalism and ter-
ritorialism that reflect their affiliations. For example, the reach of a coun-
try’s bankruptcy laws—extraterritorial or territorial—maps generally to 
                                                                                                             
 69. See e.g., Yukos I & Yukos II, discussed infra note 89. 
 70. To be petulant, I could blame the backward states who have yet to embrace uni-
versalism for creating a protracted transition period. The problem with such snarkiness is 
that territorialists could retort that it was the universalists who wanted transition in the 
first place and we were all fine in the good old days. 
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an affinity with universalism or territorialism respectively. A home coun-
try under universalism has to believe in the extraterritorial reach of its 
bankruptcy laws, as seen in, for example, § 541 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code, if it is to enable the debtor’s bankruptcy to be resolved under one 
substantive bankruptcy law.71 By contrast, countries with strict territorial 
restrictions on the scope of their bankruptcy laws, such as South Korea 
before its most recent round of insolvency law reform, clearly support 
territorialism.72 
In an uneven world of some universalists and some territorialists, a 
number of problems can develop. The first set comes from when a coun-
try is “unprincipled” (or perhaps, “pushy”). This would result from fa-
cially asymmetric territorial reach of laws. For example, a territorialist 
state should not only refuse to acknowledge the reach of a foreign state’s 
bankruptcy laws into its own jurisdiction (through non-recognition of 
judgments), but should also, to be “principled,” restrict its own law’s 
reach into other jurisdictions (for example, by disavowing adjudication 
of foreign assets). Similarly, a universalist country with extraterritorial 
application of its own bankruptcy laws must countenance the extraterri-
torial reach of other countries’ laws into its own jurisdiction (with juris-
diction-selecting rules, like COMI, to resolve the conflict presented by 
the overlap). 
Many countries’ bankruptcy laws are indeed “principled” in this re-
gard, from both the universalist and territorialist schools. For example, 
the broad reach of the U.S. assertion of bankruptcy jurisdiction under § 
541 is offset by a generous policy of deference to foreign proceedings (of 
course with inevitable exceptions). This was even so under the less-
universalist predecessor to Chapter 15, § 304.73 Similarly, countries such 
as South Korea and Hong Kong (at least under their prior, territorialist 
laws) were strict in their territorial application. While they gave a cold 
shoulder to foreign bankruptcy judgments purporting to regulate assets 
located within their jurisdictions, they would similarly stop the reach of 
their own bankruptcy laws at their own borders.74 
                                                                                                             
 71. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (defining bankruptcy estate as encompassing all property “wher-
ever located”). 
 72. See John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International 
Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 945 (2005) (discussing Korean insolvency law and 
recent amendments); Samuel L. Bufford & Kazuhiro Yanagida, Japan’s Revised Laws on 
Business Reorganization: An Analysis, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (2006). 
 73. See, e.g., In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 348 (2d Cir. 
1992) (U.S. ancillary proceeding to attach debtor’s New York bank account during Swiss 
main insolvency proceeding).  
 74. See Bufford & Yanagida, supra note 72, at 56–57 (referencing South Korea’s 
territorial application in Mika Maeda, Nikkan No Rensa Tosan To Minji Saisei Jiken [A 
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On the other hand, confirming the fears of game theorists such as Pro-
fessor Frederick Tung,75 there were less principled countries. One such 
example (a territorialist one, which is not to suggest there weren’t uni-
versalist transgressors as well) was the Netherlands, where Dutch courts 
would try to control foreign assets under Dutch bankruptcy law while at 
the same time refusing to acknowledge foreign bankruptcy courts’ pow-
ers to do the same regarding Dutch-situated assets. This “one-way” terri-
torialism has already been criticized, and rightly so, by commentators, 
including respected Dutch insolvency expert Professor Bob Wessels.76 
(This state of affairs is likely improved under the new E.U. Insolvency 
Regulation.) 
This “unprincipledness” is one problem of asymmetry, and it certainly 
creates difficulties, but it is not a pervasive one, because even territorial-
ists would castigate these “rogue states” for being too pushy and not fol-
lowing the true spirit of territorialism.77 Moreover, traditional require-
ments of reciprocity have checked this defection impulse under some 
foreign relations norms.78 Accordingly, while there are within-system 
asymmetry problems under either a universalism or territorialism regime 
by “defectors,” those are not the thrust of the present concern. It is the 
                                                                                                             
Bankruptcy Chain in Japan and Korea and a Civil Rehabilitation Case], 105 JIGYOSAISEI 
TO SAIKENKANRI [TURNAROUND & CREDIT MGMT.] 180, 183 (2004)); Charles D. Booth, 
Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the Inconsistent Ap-
proaches of Unites States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 135, 227–28 (1992) (addressing 
the territorial approach taken by Hong Kong in Am. Express Int’l Banking Corp. v. John-
son, [1984] H.K.L.R. 372 (H.C.)). 
 75. See Tung, supra note 25. 
 76. See Bob Wessels, The Comity Principle in Amice, in BIJDRAGE AAN LIBER 
AMICORUM VOOR PROF RUTGERS 347–59 (2005) (“In foreign and Dutch literature[,] the 
Dutch model of claiming universal effect for Dutch insolvency proceeding in the Nether-
lands itself has been severely criticized.”). 
 77. LoPucki provides a good discussion of how territorialists can police over-reaching 
through non-recognition of judgments. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 
204–05. 
 78. Reciprocity requirements were included in, for example, the South African adop-
tion of the UNCITRAL Model Law. See Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 s. 2(1), 
available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2000/a42-00.pdf. See also Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective Jun. 1, 2007), ch. I art. 5, trans-
lated in http://www.globalturnaround.com/cases/PRCnewBankruptcyLaw.pdf (2006) 
(P.R.C.) (providing for reciprocity). Note that the United States is actually trying to get 
away from the Alphonse/Gaston impasse of reciprocity. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. d (1987) (“A judgment otherwise entitled to recog-
nition will not be denied recognition or enforcement because courts in the rendering state 
might not enforce a judgment of a court in the United States if the circumstances were 
reversed.”). 
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between-system asymmetry problems that create a greater danger. This 
occurs when litigants unhappy with the restrictions of a “principled” ter-
ritorialist country seek to relitigate matters by sneaking into a “princi-
pled” universalist country’s courtroom. This is the real forum shopping 
of the current world of incomplete universalism. 
This concern is not mere theory. It has happened in actual cases. One 
striking example of this type of forum shopping can be seen with the 
Maruko proceedings.79 Maruko was a Japanese developer. Japan (again, 
at least until its most recent set of reforms) was a territorialist jurisdic-
tion, and “principledly” so; it restricted the scope of its own bankruptcy 
proceedings to assets within its physical jurisdiction. When Maruko filed 
for bankruptcy in Japan (its uncontested COMI), the proceedings did not 
reach its myriad foreign assets, including a hotel in Australia’s sun-
drenched Gold Coast. From the perspective of Japanese bankruptcy law, 
this was not a problem: Australian law would apply to those assets if and 
when proceedings were opened there. Indeed, as expected, legal action 
did commence in Australia; a collection proceeding was brought by a 
commercial lender who was understandably unhappy with the state of its 
mortgage with Maruko. Disinclined to work out a restructuring plan, the 
creditor instituted foreclosure to liquidate the property.80 The problem for 
Maruko was that Australian substantive bankruptcy law gave the mort-
gagee too powerful a negotiating endowment for its liking: a secured 
creditor in Australia can proceed to foreclose in the event of bankruptcy, 
unfettered by a stay.81 While this may upset Professor Jackson, it is cer-
tainly a commonplace legal protection for secured creditors in Com-
monwealth jurisdictions.82 
Maruko’s “solution” to the “problem” of Australia’s policy decision to 
accord super-protection to secured creditors in bankruptcy was for Ma-
ruko to open insolvency proceedings in the (universalist) United States 
and invoke its (universalist) worldwide stay. It did, and the stay had real 
pinch due to in personam general jurisdiction over the lender; the Austra-
lian foreclosure ground to a halt. Did the United States have a legitimate 
                                                                                                             
 79. See In re Maruko, Inc., 200 B.R. 876 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996). 
 80. This of course is the classic creditor’s bargain problem, where a trigger-happy 
creditor can seize an available asset at the potential expense of all creditors—hence the 
need for collective resolution in bankruptcy. See JACKSON, supra note 68. 
 81. See Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, §§ 440A (secured creditors with substan-
tially all of a debtor’s property under a lien), 440B (secured creditors who have acted to 
enforce their claims before the appointment of an administrator), 440C (secured creditors 
who have a lien on perishable property) (Austl.). 
 82. See e.g., Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C., ch.B-3, §69 (1985) (Can.); see also LoPucki, 
Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 164.  
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interest in regulating the insolvency estate of a Japanese debtor’s Austra-
lian assets? Doubtful. Yet universalists celebrated the Maruko outcome, 
extolling the “value-preserving” capacity of the U.S. stay that rescued the 
Australian resort from liquidation at the hands of an impatient creditor 
while a consensual restructuring could be approved.83 Territorialists, by 
contrast, spluttered over the “intimidation” of the Australian courts by 
the U.S. courts and cast Maruko as a black eye, rather than cap feather, 
for universalism.84 
The territorialists are right, but not for the reasons they think they are. 
They are correct that Maruko is a bad case, notwithstanding its arguably 
sympathetic outcome, and that in an ideal world the United States would 
have butted out (as a doctrinal matter, this could have been done under § 
305).85 But they are wrong to paint Maruko as an indictment of univers-
alism.86 The skewed outcome of Maruko was neither the fault of the 
United States nor universalism. Rather, the “fault,” to the extent it even 
makes sense to ascribe fault to a bankruptcy proceeding, is equally Ja-
pan’s and territorialism’s. Had Japan subscribed to a system of universal-
ism, none of this would have (or should have) happened. Under such a 
scenario, Japanese law would have controlled, per the COMI of Maruko, 
and Australia (assuming it supported universalism too) would have com-
plied with a request for assistance by convening an ancillary proceeding. 
Without getting into the safeguard protections for local creditors under a 
more modified form of universalism,87 the point is that the only plausible 
case for the application of U.S. law was due to the necessarily incom-
plete scope of the Japanese proceedings in the first place. Thus to say 
that Maruko shows how universalist jurisdictions distort transnational 
insolvencies is not just inaccurate; by refusing to shoulder equal respon-
sibility on the territorialist home state, it is unfair.88 Had all three juris-
dictions been universalists (equally, had all three jurisdictions been terri-
                                                                                                             
 83. See Bufford, Global Venue Controls, supra note 10, at 116. 
 84. See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 163–64 (“What [universal-
ists such as Bufford] refer to as deference to the U.S. stay was actually intimidation by 
it.”). 
 85. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(2) (2006) (permitting abstention of cases properly brought 
within the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts to assist foreign proceedings); see also LoPucki, 
Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 164 (“The Maruko transaction was entirely do-
mestic to Australia . . . . ”). 
 86. See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 164 (“Maruko demonstrates 
the potential for unpredictability in a universalist regime.”). 
 87. 11 U.S.C. § 1522 (2006). 
 88. Thus LoPucki’s criticism of universalism as “fail[ing]” the KPNQwest bankruptcy 
in the Netherlands may be similarly unfair. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 
2, at 226. 
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torialists), this cross-global forum shop would have failed. It was only 
the interaction between territorialist Japanese law and universalist U.S. 
law that created this (realized) opportunity for forum shopping and reliti-
gation.89 
VI. UNIVERSALISM’S RESPONSE TO THE REAL FORUM SHOPPING 
If the true problem of forum shopping is caused by exploitation of dif-
ferences between universalist and territorialist states’ jurisdictional rules, 
is there anything that can be done today, in the real world, before the 
complete acceptance of universalism?90 There is reason to think that the 
answer is yes, and that universalism, as implemented by Chapter 15, has 
already started. Recall that the problem in Maruko was that a U.S. stay 
extraterritorially blocked seizure of a Japanese debtor’s assets located in 
Australia. Because Chapter 15 now expressly recognizes jurisdictional 
hierarchy (a necessary foundation of universalism),91 the U.S. bank-
ruptcy regime has adjusted the scope of its automatic stay accordingly. 
Specifically, § 1520(a)(1) now confines the automatic stay that is trig-
gered by recognition of a foreign main proceeding, i.e., when the United 
States has been determined not to be the COMI of the debtor. This is the 
sort of recognition, and hence “light-form” stay, that would have oc-
curred had Maruko been brought as a Chapter 15 proceeding. The new 
                                                                                                             
 89. The most dramatic recent example of this same sort of forum shopping is (both 
installments of) the Yukos insolvency, in which unhappy litigants in quasi-territorialist 
Russian proceedings tried to get a U.S. stay to stymie unwelcome legal developments 
both in and outside Russia. The first U.S. hearing saw through this maneuver as an im-
permissible collateral attack—adding an excellent counterpoint to the Maruko case, be-
cause here the court’s decision reached an unsympathetic outcome—and bit the bullet to 
dismiss the U.S. case. See In re Yukos Oil Co. (Yukos I), 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2005). The second U.S. hearing fell for the trap, asserted jurisdiction, and vindicated the 
re-biting of the apple by foreign litigants who had already lost in their home courts. See 
In re Yukos Oil Co. (Yukos II), No. 06-B-10775-RDD, 2006 WL 3026024 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006). 
 90. Or before a complete abandonment of universalism back to territorialism—
although that would require quite some winding back of the clock: U.S. courts have been 
recognizing the binding nature of Canadian court restructurings of Canadian debtors for 
over a century, even against U.S. creditors who invest in, but do not want to litigate in, 
Canada. See Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883) (“That the laws of 
a country have no extraterritorial force is an axiom of international jurisprudence, but 
things done in one country under the authority of law may be of binding effect in another 
country.”). 
 91. 11 U.S.C. § 1517 (2006) (distinguishing between “foreign main” and “foreign 
non-main” proceedings and attaching hierarchical legal consequence to each, such as, 
e.g., imposition of an automatic stay for the former but only discretionary stay for the 
latter). 
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limitation to the U.S. stay in these circumstances is that it only applies to 
assets within the physical jurisdiction of the United States.92 Indeed, even 
if a full-blown plenary proceeding is opened under Chapter 11 (which 
would implicate § 541’s reach of an extraterritorial estate) after recogni-
tion of a foreign main proceeding, § 1528 now provides that such a ple-
nary proceeding, albeit conducted under U.S. substantive law, is still 
generally limited to the assets within the physical territory of the United 
States. In other words, Maruko would not have been possible under 
Chapter 15. This is because the solution, from the universalist perspec-
tive, of territorialist-jurisdiction litigants trying to forum shop into uni-
versalism’s necessarily extraterritorial reach of law, is to make it clear ex 
ante that the existence of non-U.S. COMI proceedings will preclude the 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. bankruptcy law. 
Chapter 15’s approach arguably codifies what some courts were al-
ready struggling to do when facing inter-system friction: respect the 
home jurisdiction’s intended scope of its bankruptcy law. One such case 
was the Axona decision from the early 1990s.93 In Axona, a Hong Kong 
debtor filed for liquidation in Hong Kong, which had (“principled”) terri-
torialist bankruptcy laws. Because there were assets in the United States, 
the Hong Kong liquidator opened U.S. proceedings (his Hong Kong ter-
ritorialist proceedings having disavowed jurisdiction over the U.S. as-
sets), with an eye to recovering a transfer that was preferential under 
U.S. bankruptcy law.94 Case law of a universalist bent in the United 
States had crafted a rule that § 304 ancillary proceedings should apply 
the avoidance law of the debtor’s home jurisdiction.95 The liquidator, 
however, wanted to use U.S. law because Hong Kong law would have 
insulated the payment from recovery. Accordingly, the liquidator side-
stepped § 304 and opened a full plenary proceeding in the United States, 
successfully voiding the transaction that would have been unassailable 
under strictly universalist application of Hong Kong law. Adding insult 
to injury to the U.S. preference recipient, the liquidator then dismissed 
the proceedings under § 305 “in deference” to the Hong Kong proceed-
ing, which had the effect of returning the assets to Hong Kong, a juris-
diction in which they would have never been recoverable under local 
bankruptcy law.96 
                                                                                                             
 92. 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1) (2006). 
 93. See In re Axona Int’l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1988); Am. Express Int’l Banking Corp. v. Johnson, [1984] H.K.L.R. 372 (H.C.). 
 94. See Axona, 88 B.R. at 602–03. 
 95. See In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674, 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 96. See Axona, 88 B.R. at 618–19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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While some universalists begrudged the application of U.S. avoidance 
law to what was a Hong Kong-COMI bankruptcy,97 Professor Charles 
Booth came to the defense of Axona.98 The universalists, Booth implied, 
were assuming that Hong Kong law was universalist and intended its 
preference law to apply extraterritorially to transfers of assets in the 
United States. But that was not the case. On the contrary, Hong Kong 
expected U.S. avoidance law to apply to any U.S. assets and would have 
been surprised by § 304’s application of Hong Kong law. As such, it was 
not forum shopping (or “section shopping” as Booth called it)99 by the 
Hong Kong liquidator—although to be sure he achieved the substantive 
result he desired—but scrupulous adherence to the jurisdictional restric-
tions of Hong Kong law. Axona is not a case without problems,100 but it 
serves as a counterpoint to Maruko to show how universalist and territo-
rialist jurisdictions were supposed to interact in an imperfect environ-
ment. Chapter 15’s new restrictions on the U.S. stay may be seen as a 
related effort to codify appropriate measures to address inter-system is-
sues in an interregnum world. 
Accordingly, whatever the steps taken to combat forum shopping un-
der § 304 in the past, I contend Chapter 15 now prevents Maruko-style 
forum shopping due to the recalibration of the automatic stay. Has this 
brave claim been put to the test in the first year of Chapter 15’s early 
life? It has, and it was shown spectacularly wrong. This comeuppance 
                                                                                                             
 97. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2540 (1996). 
 98. Booth, supra note 74, at 227–28. 
 99. Id. at 229. 
 100. It is not clear, for example, whether it was appropriate to distribute the proceeds 
of the U.S. avoidance action according to Hong Kong distribution law; there is a case to 
be made that the law of distribution should track the law of avoidance. See Jay L. West-
brook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 499 
(1991). In Axona, however, all creditors participated and so choice of distribution law 
was likely irrelevant, but the problem persists at a theoretical level. More broadly, a po-
tential problem with Axona is that the choice of a § 304 (Hong Kong preference law) 
proceeding versus a Chapter 11 (U.S. avoidance law) proceeding essentially gave the 
liquidator an option on substantive law, which some might see as unfair. But fairness is 
tricky in this context, because while it may seem unfair to allow a Hong Kong debtor a 
second crack at more favorable U.S. law, it should not seem unfair to subject a U.S. 
creditor to U.S. law. Moreover, one’s view of fairness may depend on whether one is the 
creditor whose transfer is under attack or the rank-and-file creditor who seeks increased 
estate funds for distribution. 
  Note that for all its improvements, Chapter 15 would actually seem to permit an 
Axona repeat. See Axona, 88 B.R. at 597; 11 U.S.C. § 1528 (2005). 
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occurred in the case of Yukos II.101 In these 2006 proceedings, a Russian 
debtor had been petitioned into an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding in 
its home country, which appears to have a territorialist or at least quasi-
territorialist bankruptcy law.102 The Russian administrator in Yukos II 
then traveled to the Netherlands (another territorialist jurisdiction) to in-
tervene in unfolding legal proceedings there regarding collection on a 
corporate subsidiary’s assets. For reasons that are too complicated and 
painful to explain here, the administrator did not get the substantive out-
come he wanted in the Netherlands, much like the unhappy Maruko 
debtor in Australia. And also like the Maruko loser, the Russian adminis-
trator wanted a second bite at the apple. The only way he could do so 
was to try a “Hail Mary” filing in a universalist jurisdiction elsewhere 
that might throw a wrench into the disappointing Dutch proceedings. He 
did just that: perhaps having read Maruko, the Russian administrator 
came to America and opened a Chapter 15 proceeding in the Southern 
District of New York. 
Under Chapter 15, the result should have been either recognition of the 
Russian proceeding as a main or a non-main foreign proceeding (or, 
more likely, dismissal for public policy reasons beyond the scope of this 
discussion).103 If the Russian proceeding had been recognized as a main 
proceeding (the corporate formalism of Russian law made even that a 
confusing question), the most invasive U.S. law could have gotten would 
have been through imposition of the new territorially limited “light-
form” stay of § 1520(a)(1). The substantive decisions of the Dutch pro-
ceedings, and the assets under its jurisdiction, should have been unaf-
fected. Sadly, that did not happen. On the contrary, the U.S. court took 
                                                                                                             
 101. See In re Yukos Oil Co. (Yukos II), No. 06-B-10775-RDD, 2006 WL 3026024 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006). 
 102.  Characterizing Russia as territorialist is uncertain at best; there is some sugges-
tion that it might expect extraterritorial application of Russian bankruptcy law but not 
recognize foreign bankruptcy orders, in which case it would be an “unprincipled” territo-
rialist. What is known about Russian commercial law is that it is strictly formalist in its 
treatment of the corporate form, and so the conceptual rigidity of territorialism seems 
plausibly related. See Holger Muent and Francesca Pissarides, Impact of Collateral Prac-
tice on Lending to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, Law in Transition, Fall 2000: 
Secured Transactions 64 (EBRD Autumn 2000), available at http://www.ebrd.com/ 
pubs/legal/lit002c.pdf. 
 103. 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006). The Yukos debacle is a brazen display of confiscatory 
taxation. The Russian government renationalized this strategic energy resource by con-
cocting dubiously legal “back taxes” against the company and then seizing its assets for 
non-payment of these taxes. Litigation is unfolding before the European Court of Justice 
regarding this confiscation as an allegedly uncompensated taking. It is a melodramatic 
affair, with criminal intrigue on the part of Yukos officers too. Suffice it to say that po-
litical opposition to the Kremlin is ill-advised for those uninterested in Siberia. 
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the bait and granted a temporary restraining order (possibly ultra vires) to 
block the Dutch proceedings, and, as in Maruko, in personam jurisdiction 
over the defendants made that order stick. Accordingly, the Dutch action, 
like the Australian foreclosure action in Maruko, ground to a halt by 
command of a remote U.S. court sitting far away from the debtor’s 
COMI. 
The Yukos II outcome was no fault of Chapter 15. It was the fault of a 
court that did not fully understand Chapter 15’s design and the manda-
tory jurisdictional role of “recognition.” (In fairness to the court, one way 
to read Yukos II is that the judge was stretching the law—or at least de-
ferring reaching an inevitable decision on the law that would have fore-
closed jurisdiction—in a noble attempt to pressure the parties to set-
tle.)104 Yukos II has already been criticized academically, so there is no 
point to repeat an airing of the grievances.105 Its inclusion in the instant 
discussion is in the spirit of full disclosure of contrary authority. The 
reader should feel comforted that it would probably not have survived 
appellate review,106 which allows reinstatement of the claim from above: 
Maruko-style forum shopping should be impossible—or at least require 
the sort of judicial back-breaking of Yukos II—under Chapter 15. This is 
universalism’s solution to the real forum shopping of inter-system juris-
dictional arbitrage between territorialist and universalist venues. 
VII. REPRISE: THE SCOPE OF FORUM SHOPPING UNDER UNIVERSALISM 
VS. TERRITORIALISM 
There is a final forum-shopping complaint against universalism by ter-
ritorialists concerning not the ease, but the scope, of the problem. Ini-
tially, Professor LoPucki makes two seemingly contradictory predictions. 
The first is that as universalism’s choice of law rule—COMI—becomes 
more entrenched, it will be harder for ancillary jurisdictions to hold onto 
cases (and hence assets), because it will become harder to contest pri-
mary jurisdiction. In other words, universalism’s “precommitment” to 
the cession of jurisdiction pursuant to the COMI rule will remove the ex 
post check available to judges to hold onto cases under ad hoc territorial-
                                                                                                             
 104. And even so the court eventually got fed up and dissolved the stay. See Yukos II, 
2006 WL 3026024. Notwithstanding the charitable interpretation of the case, the criti-
cism remains that it is not the place of judges to distort doctrines of jurisdiction simply to 
come up with seemingly attractive results.  
 105. At least I criticized it. See John A. E. Pottow, Cutting Chapter 15’s Teeth: The 
Yukos Adventure (Presentation Paper to INSOL 2006 Academic Conference, May 2006).  
 106. Although the reader’s comfort may be tempered by the scarcity of such appeals in 
practice. 
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ism.107 The second claim is that because judges and courts “compete” for 
jurisdiction—holding themselves out as attractive venues to case plac-
ers—they will not readily relinquish jurisdiction to main proceedings 
under the COMI rule if they lose the competition.108 Leaving aside the 
apparent tension of these positions,109 each requires response. Actually, 
the first point has already been responded to above in the discussion of 
the role choice of law clarity plays in forum shopping: the COMI rule is 
crisp, but not as crisp as others. As for the second point, regarding the 
temptation of courts to shade ambiguous jurisdictional claims at the mar-
gin and a disinclination to cede control ex post, I am in full agreement 
with Professor LoPucki and have written so elsewhere regarding the 
pride of courts.110 The solace I take under the early case law of Chapter 
15 is that this margin may be a narrow one. For example, in one recent 
case, the U.S. court after a thorough and methodical analysis deferred to 
St. Vincent as the COMI of a foreign insurance company debtor, not-
withstanding the objection of U.S. creditors and the presence of sizable 
(and seizable) U.S. assets that would have made a “corrupt” U.S. judge 
salivate.111 
                                                                                                             
 107. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 205 (“[Universalism] seeks to 
precommit the countries of the world to recognize and enforce each other’s bankruptcy 
decisions. If universalists succeed, they will eliminate the need for after-the-fact, case-by-
case recognition . . . .”). 
 108. Id. at 209 (“In thinking that the home country standard will be sufficient to con-
trol international forum shopping, the universalists have underestimated . . . the pressures 
on courts and countries to win at least a share of the world’s multibillion-dollar bank-
ruptcy industry for themselves.”); id. at 217–18, 223–24; see also LoPucki, Universalism 
Unravels, supra note 2, at 152. 
 109. One way to resolve the contradiction is to distinguish ex ante from ex post compe-
tition. Jurisdictions compete ex ante by drafting substantively attractive bankruptcy laws. 
Jurisdictions compete ex post by saying that once a bankruptcy case is filed in their 
venue—once they have won the spoils of attracting cases—they will relinquish or cede 
jurisdiction to another venue over the judge’s dead body. 
 110. John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems 
of and Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests,” 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1918–19 
(2006). 
 111. See In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006). 
Perhaps then LoPucki and I differ only by degree rather than kind regarding the inclina-
tion judges will have to shade jurisdiction. I see problems at the margin but see the mar-
gin as not overly wide. By contrast, LoPucki’s skepticism is deep-seated. See, e.g., 
LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 152 (“Judge Bufford bases his solution 
on the assumption that judges will be disinterested and unbiased—an assumption he 
makes little attempt to justify or explain.”). Perhaps a cynic might explain Tri-
Continental as a consequence of the Eastern District of California being a sleepy backwa-
ter unattuned to (or unable to compete meaningfully in) the heady world of jurisdictional 
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But this latter point ties into the broader concern LoPucki has with the 
scope of forum shopping under universalism. LoPucki worries that even 
if it is just as easy to move assets as it is to move COMI (which he never 
concedes),112 it is still more troubling to move COMI because, in es-
sence, the stakes are higher.113 Under territorialism, if some assets can be 
moved out of jurisdiction to shop favorable law, then there is a definite, 
but only partial loss. By contrast, if COMI is successfully shopped, then 
the loss is a complete one—all assets will be adjudicated subject to the 
haven’s bankruptcy laws, not just the assets that were able to be moved 
there.114 In other words, universalism puts all the choice of law eggs in 
one basket. This argument is a legitimate one, and universalists should 
not pretend that it isn’t. The forum shopping stakes are higher under uni-
versalism. What is not conceded, however, is that it is easier or as easy to 
forum shop under universalism as it is under territorialism, as discussed 
above. Thus, for now, LoPucki and I draw to an empirical stalemate.115 
While the empirics may be an open question, theory leaves one mark 
against territorialism in the final analysis of forum shopping. It is what 
might be called the “attitudinal” issue: that territorialism is worse dis-
posed than universalism to deal with its forum shopping problems. One 
of the key advantages territorialism purports to wield over universalism 
is that it does not need to rely upon international cooperation, goodwill, 
and other such namby-pamby values.116 It is set to deal with the rough 
and tumble insolvency state of nature. That may be so, at least as a first 
cut. But when one introduces concerns of forum shopping, which under 
territorialism entails the improper movement of assets across borders, 
then solutions need to be designed to relocate assets to their “proper” 
                                                                                                             
competition. Even the cynic, however, might find it difficult not to be encouraged by 
Hans Brochier Holdings Ltd., supra note 53. 
 112. In fact, he seems to countenance asset movement with great sanguinity. See 
LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 160–61. 
 113. See id. at 148 (“Universalism is an all-or-nothing system. A single court gets the 
case, and runs it worldwide.”). 
 114. See id. at 160 (“In today’s territorial system, eve-of-bankruptcy transfers can alter 
creditor priorities, but only in the assets transferred. [A change in the debtor’s COMI] 
could alter creditor priorities in all the debtor’s assets. . . .”). 
 115. It is interesting that the European Union Insolvency Regulation’s Preamble fo-
cuses on the movement of assets in expressing a desire to diminish forum shopping. See 
EU Regulation, supra note 1.  
 116. See e.g., Lopucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 2, at 2243–45; see also 
LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 164 (“[T]erritoriality requires no coop-
eration. . . .”). 
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locations.117 And these solutions, as territorialists concede, include con-
ventions and treaties (presumably from an ex ante perspective, because 
ex post it will be impossible for the very competitive forces LoPucki 
fears),118 which are the very sorts of cooperative international efforts ter-
ritorialism disdains.119 This raises the question: if an asset return conven-
tion needs to be negotiated to shore up territorialism against forum shop-
ping, why not just continue to negotiate a choice of law convention to 
empower universalism?120 
VIII. FINAL REFLECTION: IS FORUM SHOPPING ALL THAT BAD? 
The final question that bears mention in an anaylsis of bankruptcy fo-
rum shopping is the degree to which one should even worry about it. Af-
ter all, the whole paradigm of contractualism is premised upon ex ante 
forum shopping, animated by a belief that such shopping is good and will 
be more of a race to the top than a race to the bottom.121 If so, then is 
forum shopping in the international bankruptcy arena something to worry 
about in the first place?122 
                                                                                                             
 117. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 749 (1999) (“Implementing this rule 
would necessitate treaties that require the return of fleeing assets . . . .”). As I have writ-
ten elsewhere, I am skeptical that the sorts of jurisdictions likely to style themselves as 
havens will be enthusiastic about joining these conventions. See Pottow, supra note 72, at 
955 n.83. 
 118. See infra note 120. 
 119. See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 164 (“[T]erritoriality re-
quires no cooperation beyond that which already occurs.”). 
 120. In his earlier writings, LoPucki embraced treaties and conventions as the way to 
return fleeing assets to their proper location. See LoPucki, supra note 117. He may have 
backed off his earlier support as suggesting (I think) not that states should negotiate such 
treaties ex ante, but rather that they should do them ad hoc and ex post—if and when an 
asset flight dispute arises. See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 164 
(“Judge Bufford strains to make my proposal for a cooperative territorial regime depend-
ent on treaties and conventions. I repeat here that it is not. . . . Territoriality . . . provides a 
stable platform for treaties and conventions dealing with specific opportunities for mutual 
benefit, such as the return of fleeing assets.”). I may be misreading his most recent articu-
lation of his position. If he has indeed changed his stance, this new position is unlikely to 
generate many agreements. Agreements after the assets have flown are likely to interest 
the country whence the assets flew much more than the country where they landed. 
 121. See Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies, supra note 13. 
 122. The most recent and eloquent proponent of this comfort with forum shopping has 
been Professor Rasmussen. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, 
Whither the Race? A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reor-
ganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 291 (2001) (“Competition can be a good thing.”); 
Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Forum Shopping by Insol-
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Clearly courts worry.123 Consider the contortions one court recently 
worked on Chapter 15 and the concept of jurisdiction to frustrate what it 
saw as naked forum shopping.124 Clearly Professor LoPucki, who liter-
ally wrote the book on it, worries too.125 Nor is the worry exclusively 
domestic.126 I confess, however, to being more conflicted.127 Perhaps the 
                                                                                                             
vent Corporations, 94 NW. L. REV. 1357 (2001) (applauding jurisdictional competition in 
certain contexts, such as “prepackaged” bankruptcies).  
 123. See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 521 (1953) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting) (describing forum shopping as “evil”). For a thorough recent discussion of forum 
shopping, see Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 362 (2006). 
 124. See In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 121–22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). While the 
court’s concern over forum shopping may have been well placed, it is not clear why the 
court could not have recognized the proceeding as a foreign main proceeding and then 
lifted the automatic stay thereby imposed (under 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1)) by resorting to 
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), which permits lifting the stay for “cause” and illustrates a non-
exhaustive example of cause as inadequate protection of a security interest. 11 U.S.C. § 
362(d)(1) (2006). Also, if the automatic stay was really the true, nefarious purpose for 
bringing the Chapter 15 proceeding, it is unclear why the same effect could not have been 
achieved by filing a full-blown Chapter 11, which would have imposed an automatic stay 
without need for recognition (although then the foreign representatives would have at-
torned to U.S. jurisdiction, which they may have been trying to avoid by using Chapter 
15 under the most suspicious read of the case’s facts). For criticism of the SPhinX case, 
see Daniel M. Glosband, SPhinX Chapter 15 Opinion Misses the Mark, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Dec.–Jan. 2007, at 44. 
 125. See, e.g., LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 193 (“Thus, the down-
ward spiral of international competition has already begun. . . . Besides the United States, 
the big winners from international forum shopping have been the offshore havens, most 
notably Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.”). 
 126. The European Court of Justice recently decided a case in which it held that post-
filing relocation of an individual debtor from Germany to Spain (and hence change of her 
COMI) did not divest the German court of jurisdiction over main proceedings. Case C-
1/04, Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. I-701 (Judgment of the Court). One of the 
primary reasons supporting its ruling was a concern about forum shopping. See id. ¶¶ 3, 
25 (noting that European Union Insolvency Regulation’s Preamble’s Fourth Recital ex-
pressly mentions intent of law “to avoid incentives for the parties to transfer assets or 
judicial proceedings from one Member State to another, seeking to obtain a more favour-
able legal position” (derived from the Virgós-Schmit report, see supra note 41)). Id. ¶ 25. 
Indeed, the recital actually defines this incentive, in parentheses, as “forum shopping.” 
EU Regulation, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶ 4. Note that in this case, contrary to forum shop-
ping intuitions, Germany was trying to dismiss the action in her courts, and the Spanish 
(erstwhile German) debtor—who had moved COMI—was fighting to keep the applicabil-
ity of German law. Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. I-701 ¶ 16. 
 127. Cf. Case C-1/04, Susanne Staubitz-Schrieber, 2006 E.C.R. I-701 (Opinion of the 
Advocate-General), ¶¶ 70–73. 
[I]n general, lawyers regard the term [“forum shopping”] as pejorative. If fo-
rum shopping is defined as the search by a plaintiff for the international juris-
diction most favourable to his claims, there is no doubt that, in the absence of 
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matter is one of notice. If the purpose of having a debtor’s COMI “ascer-
tainable by third parties”128 is to prevent unfair jurisdictional surprise by 
seemingly domestic companies having brass plate headquarters in Ha-
venland, then presumably a well disseminated notice system of applica-
ble bankruptcy law could allow an efficient choice regime. The lingering 
worry I have regards systemic bias between those likely to have, process, 
and credit-adjust to that notice and those likely to not.129 Thus I flag the 
issue of contractualism for consideration, but leave its case to be made 
by its more eloquent proponent, Professor Rasmussen.130 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In 2007, forum shopping remains a concern in transnational bank-
ruptcy. Attempting to dispel the myth that universalism facilitates forum 
shopping, this Article has advanced arguments why territorialism may be 
just as bad, if not worse, both in terms of the predictability of its choice 
of law rule as well as the likely (but not yet empirically tested) greater 
ease with which assets can be moved than COMIs. It has also argued that 
the real problem of forum shopping in today’s world of incomplete uni-
versalism lies in cases such as Maruko and Yukos II, where unhappy ter-
ritorialist-country suitors try to have a second crack under the bankruptcy 
law of a remote universalist jurisdiction. This is not a flaw with univers-
alism any more than it is a flaw with territorialism; it is a necessary by-
                                                                                                             
legal uniformity in the different private international law systems, that phe-
nomenon must be accepted as a natural consequence which is not open to criti-
cism. . . . Forum shopping is merely the optimisation of procedural possibilities 
and it results from the existence of more than one available forum, which is no 
way unlawful. However, where forum shopping leads to unjustified inequality 
between the parties to a dispute with regard to the defence of their respective 
interests, the practice must be considered and its eradication is a legitimate leg-
islative objective. 
Id. (citations omitted). The Advocate General’s remarks hearken back to Professor Frie-
drich Jeunger’s reminder that “not all forum shopping merits condemnation” and warning 
“not to let a disparaging term becloud our thinking.” Friedrich K. Jeunger, Forum Shop-
ping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 570–71 (1989); see also Rasmus-
sen & Thomas, supra note 122 (arguing generally, on efficiency grounds, for warmer 
embrace of “forum shopping” with prepackaged bankruptcies than with traditional bank-
ruptcies).  
 128. See Virgós-Schmit Report, supra note 41, at 281; see also also EU Regulation, 
supra note 1, recital 13, at 2. 
 129. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 2, at 232 (“The losers will be the 
corporate outsiders who have no means of controlling their debtor’s choice of courts: tort 
victims, employees, suppliers, customers, other stakeholders with small interests, and—as 
with every strategy game—the less sophisticated players.”). 
 130. And his occasional co-author Professor Thomas. See supra note 122. 
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product of an interim regime. The solution to this more complex type of 
forum shopping is to make it more difficult, if not impossible, to open 
extraterritorial proceedings in universalist jurisdictions for debtors whose 
COMIs lie elsewhere. And that is what, notwithstanding the misunder-
standing of some courts, Chapter 15 in the United States has tried to do. 
